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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
SPENCER VAN NOY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8627

RICHARD GIBBS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT,
RICHARD GIBBS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are for the most part not disputed.
On the 24th day of January, 1955, the Plaintiff and Respondent
herein, Spencer Van Noy, hereinafter referred to as VanNoy,
executed and delivered to the Defendant and Appellant,
Richard Gibbs, hereinafter referred to as Gibbs, an Assignment, Exhibit D-1 (R-87). By this Assignment, Van Noy
purported to sell, transfer and assign all of his right, title and
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interest to shares of capital stock in the Valley Amusement
Enterprises, Incorporated, to Gibbs in consideration of the
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ( $2,000.00), Seven Hundred
Fifty Dollars ( $750.00) down, receipt of which was acknowledged, and the balance, or Twelve Hundred Fifty Dollars
$1,250.00) payable within ninety days. Gibbs received the
Assignment, Exhibit 1, and paid the amount of Seven Hundred
Fifty Dollars ( $750.00), on or about the 24th day of January,
1955. The stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises Corporation which VanNoy purported to sell to Gibbs was never
issued by the corporation to Mr. VanNoy (R-61) and was never
delivered by Van Noy to Gibbs. Both VanNoy and Gibbs at
the time the Assignment was executed believed that the Valley
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, owned a leasehold interest in certain property situated at 3793 South State Street
in Salt Lake City. The Articles of Incorporation of Valley
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, were filed with the Secretary of State on December 22, 1954. Spencer Van Noy subscribed to Nineteen Hundred Fifty (1950) shares of stock of
a par value of Nineteen Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1950.00)
(R-89). The Articles of Incorporation recited that the capital
stock of the corporation consisted of a lease dated the 1st day
of December, 1953 covering the property located at 3793
South State Street, Salt Lake City. Whatever monies Van Noy
spent in the venture at the Copa Supper Club were expended
in building and remodeling the building prior to the time of
the incorporation of Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated (R 54) and after the incorporation of Valley Amusement Company, Van Noy paid nothing into the corporation
(R. 61). Van Noy first became interested in the Copa Supper
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Club in September of 1954 (R- 50). At the time Gibbs became
mterested in the Copa Supper Club and Valley Amusement
Company the premises at 3793 South State were pretty well
completed and decorated and the business was ready to open.
At that point, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, together with
others, had a meeting for the purpose of incorporating the
Valley Amusement Company (R-53). Mr. Van Noy wanted
so much for his investment and he agreed to take stock in
the newly formed corporation for money and work which
he had already expended on the leasehold at the Copa Supper
Club (R-54). Van Noy acknowledged on the stand that at
the time of the taking of his deposition that he thought there
was a lease on the building (R-58). Subsequently it was determined by Dr. Gibbs that there was no lease on the building
and that there never had been. Gibbs was obtaining the outstanding interests in the Valley Amusement Company for
the purpose of obtaining the leasehold interest which both
Gibbs and Van Noy thought existed on the premises, and he
would not have purchased the same had he known the leasehold interest did not exist (R-76). Gibbs, through his counsel,
offered to return the Assignment to Van Noy and accept his
Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $750.00) back, which Van Noy
refused to do (R-59). The evidence is uncontroverted that no
leasehold existed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE
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NO STOCK CERTIFICATES WERE DELIVERED OR
TENDERED TO THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 16-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, AND HAVING FAILED
TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATES THE PLAINTIFF HAD
NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
(

Point II.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A LEASEHOLD INTEREST WHICH WAS THE ONLY SUPPOSED ASSET
OF THE VALLEY AMUSEMENT COMPANY AND SUCH
LEASE DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE FORMATION OF THE CORPORATION OR AT ANY TIME,
WHICH RESULTED IN A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE CONTRACT.

Point III.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON DEFENDANT'S
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE REASON THAT THERE
WAS A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS ENTITLED TO
RESCIND THE CONTRACT AND RECEIVE BACK THE
AMOUNT PAID.
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ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE
NO STOCK CERTIFICATES WERE DELIVERED OR
TENDERED TO THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 16-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, AND HAVING FAILED
TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATES THE PLAINTIFF HAD
NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
Section 16-3-1 U.C.A. 1953 provides the exclusive manner

for transfer of shares of stock in a corporation. This Section
reads in part as follows:
"Title to a certificate and to the shares represented
thereby can be transferred only:

( 1) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in
blank or to a specified person by the person appearing
by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby; or
( 2) By delivery of the certificate and a separate document containing a written assignment of the certificate
or a power of attorney to sell, assign or transfer the
same or the shares represented thereby. Such assignment
or power of attorney may be either in blank or to a
specified person. * * * ''
An attempted transfer of shares of stock without delivery
of the certificate is governed by Section 16-3-10 U.C.A. 1953,
which reads as follows:
"An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to
the shares represented thereby without delivery of the
certificate shall have the effect of a promise to transfer,
7
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and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise
shall be determined by the law governing the formation
and performance of contracts."
These Sections of law must be considered to be incorporated
into and become part of every contract for the sale of corporate stock. Makris vs. Melis, 50 Utah 544, 167 P. 802-804.
The evidence in the case at bar indicates conclusively that
the Plaintiff cannot deliver the certificate of stock as required
by law. The subscription to the 1950 shares of stock which
Van Noy made was supposedly paid for by work and services
performed in the construction and building of the Copa Supper
Club prior to the incorporation of Valley Amusement Corporation. Had the lease been in existence, such work performed
upon the leasehold interest would, no doubt, increase the
value of the leasehold and become a proper subject for transfer
into the corporation in consideration for the issuance for its
shares of stock. However, in this case, no leasehold existed
and therefore Van Noy is not entitled to have the shares of
stock issued to him. Furthermore, the trial court recognized
this by requiring the Plaintiff in this case to deliver the certificate or certificates of stock of the Valley Amusement Enterprises Corporation to the Defendant. Inasmuch as no certificates
were delivered, nor can they be delivered, Section 16-3-10
U.C.A. 1953, heretofore quoted, would govern and the Plaintiff before bringing his cause of action would be required
to tender delivery of the shares of stock or show that he
could deliver the shares before bringing his lawsuit or before
having a cause of action against the Defendant. Section 16-3-10
U.C.A. requires under the conditions existing m this case
that the obligation to transfer the shares shall be governed
8
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by the law governing the formation and performance of
contracts generally. That Plaintiff is required to deliver the
certificates, under the facts of this case, we believe is governed
by Section 60-3-2 U.C.A. 1953, which provides as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and
payment of the price are concurrent conditions; that is
to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give
possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for
the price, and the buyer must be ready and willing to
pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods."
Thus we see under this Section the Plaintiff is obligated
before having a cause of action to tender delivery of the
shares of stock or the certificates of the shares of stock to the
Defendant, which the evidence shows in this case clearly was
not done. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court
of Utah in the case of Rock vs. Gustavson Oil Company, 204
Pac. 96. The Court considered a case in which there had been
a failure to deliver the stock certificates as required by the
contract. The Court held:
"Under our statute, Section 878 Compiled Laws, 1917,
shares of stock in a corporation are deemed personal
property. The certificates issued therefor are the evidence or muniments of title. Due performance of a
contract of sale on the part of the seller of stock ordinarily imports and requires a delivery of a certificate
to the buyer and until that is done by the seller the
transaction will not be regarded as a completed one.
Corey Adm'r. v. Perry Irr. Co., 50 Utah 70; 166 Pac.
672. Makris v. Melis, 50 Utah, 544, 167 Pac. 802."
The Defendant in this case believes in view of the foregoing facts that it will be impossible for the Plaintiff to comply
with the order of the Court below and deliver the shares
9
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of stock as required by the court order. We submit that a
reading of the Order recognizes in principle that the delivery
of the shares of stock and the payment of the price are concurrent conditions, as heretofore set forth, and that in view
of this the action was premature! y brought. The Court should
reverse the judgment of the lower court and hold that no cause
of action existed against the Defendant in this case.

Point II.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A LEASEHOLD INTEREST WHICH WAS THE ONLY SUPPOSED ASSET
OF THE VALLEY AMUSEMENT COMPANY AND SUCH
LEASE DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE FORMATION OF THE CORPORATION OR AT ANY TIME,
WHICH RESULTED IN A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE CONTRACT.
The Plaintiff Van Noy and others were engaged in the
construction of the premises at 3793 South State for the purpose
of operating a non-profit social club, the Copa Supper Club.
Having invested sums of money, it was the desire of all of
the persons then engaged to form a corporation to hold the
supposed leasehold interest in the property and lease the same
to the Copa Supper Club. The Defendant Gibbs was the only
one who furnished money after the formation of the Valley
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, and the only one of
10
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whom it can be said paid his subscription to the stock subscribed in Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated. The
Plaintiff and the Defendant had discussed the question of
purchasing each other's interest in the club prior to the time
the Assignment which is the subject matter of this lawsuit
was executed. The testimony of both indicates that the thing
they were dealing with was the Copa Supper Club and that
they were intending to transfer this interest by the transfer of
the shares of stock. Both were under the impression that the
corporation was validly formed; that the leasehold interest existed; that the Valley Amusement Company was in a position
to lease the premises to the Copa Supper Club and thereby to
operate the business into which all of the incorporators had
invested their money. Gibbs accepted the assignment with
the understanding that he was obtaining the leasehold interest.
Van Noy made the Assignment believing that the Valley
Amusement Company had the leasehold interest and the right
to operate the Copa Supper Club. In fact, it was the interest
in the Copa Supper Club with which the parties were intending
to deal. The Plaintiff so testified (R-42). In truth and in fact
such lease was not in existence and in accepting the Assignment of the shares of stock the Defendant received nothing
and there was a total failure of consideration.
The Supreme Court of the State of Kentucky in the case
of Neale vs. Wright, 130 Ky. 146. 112 SW. 1115, considered
"- situation almost identical to the case at bar. In that case, one
director of a corporation sold land to another director for
stock in the corporation. Both parties were greatly deceived
as to the value of the stock by the books of the corporation,

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which indicated an inventory far in excess of that which
actually existed. The Court ordered the deed to the 1and cancelled, and held:
'Persons who deal in the stock of a corporation
necessarily enter into speculative contracts and they
will not be ordinarily released simply because the stock
turned out to be worth less than it was supposed to be
worth, but here the stock which Neal transferred to
Wright for the land was of no value. As the facts
proved, he received no consideration for his land. The
parties were dealing upon the supposition that the
corporation had about four times as much merchandise
as it in fact had. Their trade was made upon the supposed condition of the corporation. There was a mutual
mistake induced by the statements of the condition of
the corporation which had been promulgated. They
were both deceived, but when the truth appears and
it is shown that there is a total failure of consideration
for the deed it will be cancelled in equity."
In the case at bar, both parties were greatly deceived with
regard to the existence of the lease. In the Articles of Incorporation (R-95) the leasehold was transferred to the corporation by agreement of the incorporators. The Articles of Incorporation were signed by both parties to this agreement and
both understood that the lease was in existence. Van Noy
had been working on the premises remodeling and building
the same and had paid rent on the premises for a period of
some months prior to the formation of the Valley Amusement
Company. We submit that in view of these facts that there
was a mutual mistake which was induced by the Articles of
Incorporation, if by nothing else. Now, after the truth appears,
to-wit, that no leasehold existed, the Plaintiff would recover
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from the Defendant the balance of the amount paid even
though under such facts there is a total failure of consideration
and that the contract is voidable having been entered into
under a mistake of a material fact. See Restatement of Contracts, Section 502, which states in part:

·· * * * Where parties on entering into a transaction
that affects their contractural relations are both under
a mistake regarding a fact assumed by them as the
basis on which they entered into the transaction it is
voidable, * * * ''
Under Comment A, the following appears:
·'Where both parties assume the existence of a
certain state of facts as the basis on which they enter
into a transaction, the transaction can be avoided by a
party who is harmed if the assumption is erroneous."
Here the parties were intending to deal with what was
known as the Copa Supper Club. Certainly the Plaintiff in
this case assumed that there was a lease inasmuch as he spent
considerable sums of money and performed a considerable
amount of labor in improving the leasehold. The Defendant
Gibbs assumed a lease existed and what he was intending to
purchase was the lease in order that he might lease the premises
to the Copa Supper Club.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington tn the
case of Lindeburg vs. Murray, 201 Pac. 759, considered a
case similar to the one at bar. In that case, stock in a corporation was sold in the belief by both parties that the assets
of the corporation were as shown by the books of the corporation. A defalcation of the bookkeeper had caused a material
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reduction in the assets of the company. The Washington Court
held:
''We think it is elementary that where there is a clear
bona fide mistake regarding material facts without
culpable negligence on the part of the person complaining the contract may be avoided and equity will
decree a recision."
"We take it that the true test in cases involving
mutual mistake of fact is whether the contract would
have been entered into had there been no mistake."
The Court in that case allowed recision of the contract
for the purchase of the stock. In the case at bar, as in the
Washington case, there is a clear bona fide case of a material
fact. The Plaintiff in this case cannot, therefore, recover the
balance of the money which the Defendant agreed to pay
by reason of the Assignment of the shares of stock.

Point III.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON DEFENDANT'S
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE REASON THAT THERE
WAS A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS ENTITLED TO
RESCIND THE CONTRACT AND RECEIVE BACK THE
AMOUNT PAID.
The Defendant, through its counsel of record, offered to
return the Assignment and asked for the Seven Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($750.00) which had been paid to be returned.
This tender was refused ( R-59). Under the facts, the reasoning
14
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and the authorities heretofore set forth, the Defendant is
entitled to rescind and receive back the amounts paid. This,
we submit, is true because there was a mutual mistake of a
material fact and a total failure of consideration.

CONCLUSION
The evidence is undisputed in this case that the stock certificates in the Valley Amusement Company were never issued and
were never delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The evidence established conclusively that the Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, did not have the leasehold on the premises
located at 3793 South State Street, which was the subject
matter of the transaction. We submit now that it would be
unreasonable to require the Defendant to pay for nothing
more than a piece of paper, to-wit, the assignment of shares
of stock which in truth and in fact the Plaintiff did not own,
having failed to pay his subscription into the corporation.
We respectfully submit that in view of the foregoing authorities and reasoning that the judgment of the lower court should
be set aside and a judgment of no cause of action entered in
favor of the Defendant Richard Gibbs and that the Defendant
be allowed to recover on his counter-claim the amount paid,
he being enittled under the facts of this case to rescind the
contract.
Respectfully submitted,
G. Hal Taylor of the firm of
TAYLOR, LUND AND GRIFFITH

Attorneys for Defendant Richard Gibbs
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